A Not-So-Elementary Christian Metaphysics

Written in the Hope of Ending the Centuries-Old Separation between Philosophy and Science and Science and Wisdom

VOLUME ONE

Re-Establishing an Initial Union among Philosophy, Science, and Wisdom by Recovering Our Understanding of Philosophy, Science:

How Philosophy, Science, Is, and Always Has Been Chiefly a Study of the Problem of the One and the Many

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Chapter 1
Why Care about
Metaphysics, Christian Metaphysics, and
Ending the Separation between
Philosophy and Science?

1. Some reasons why philosophical metaphysics is essential to the existence and nature of philosophy, science

For centuries after the development of modern physical “science,” Western “philosophers” largely avoided the study of metaphysics. As I will show in this book, a chief reason they did so was because, long before the modern age had come to be, the West had largely lost its understanding of the nature of philosophy and science, and the crucial role that metaphysics plays in relation to the existence and nature of philosophy and science. As a result, currently metaphysics has largely become the “Cinderella of the Sciences,” and the West has largely lost its understanding of the nature of philosophy and science.

If asked about the nature of this metaphysics, many people today, including many professional intellectuals, “philosophers” falsely-so-called, would answer in a way that would identify the study with something akin to “news from the spirit world.” If asked about the nature of philosophy and science, most contemporary “philosophers” could not precisely explain the nature of either and most “scientists,” also falsely-so-called, would likely conflate science with mathematical physics, but could give no rational explanation for so doing.

From a practical standpoint, educationally and culturally for the contemporary world, and the West especially, the results of this neglect of metaphysics and lack of understanding of its relation to phi-
losophy, science, have been devastating. In ancient Greek and later medieval times, metaphysics had been largely equivalent to what professional “philosophers” today call “philosophy of science.” During the high points of ancient Greek culture and the high middle ages of Christendom, metaphysics was viewed as “first philosophy.” It was recognized to be the only discipline that existed capable of judging the nature, divisions, and methods of the different arts and sciences, the only human science that could rationally judge the other sciences and rationally explain how they relate to each other and justify their existence in relationship to human life as a whole.

In the architectonically-arranged hierarchy of classical science, metaphysics tended to be viewed as the final cause of all the other arts and sciences: the one science that all the other sciences were ordered toward generating as the highest intellectual achievement of the human mind and chief explanation for the nature and existence of the arts and sciences, human culture, and civilization. One reason for this is that some influential ancients, like Aristotle, recognized that the principles of metaphysics were common to all the arts and sciences, and that devoid of integrated arts and sciences no culture can exist. Because all the arts and sciences borrow and use these principles as their chief measures, criteria, of truth, in a way, metaphysics provided for classical philosophical antiquity, classical culture, the chief means for fulfilling the Delphic Oracle’s admonition to every human being that the key to achieving science is to “know thyself.”

By, in some way, containing all the knowing principles borrowed from it and used in all the arts sciences, classical metaphysics contained for the arts and sciences the means of self-knowledge, of rationally explaining to practitioners of each and every science the origin and rational justification behind the assumptions they used as their starting points for judging truth within their respective disciplines. By so doing, it rationally justified the claims of all the arts and
sciences to be arts or sciences at all, and not to be simple matters of belief or arbitrary dogmatism.

In a way, as the final cause of all the other arts and sciences, some ancients, like Aristotle, recognized that all the other arts and sciences were borrowing, analogously transferring to their own disciplines, principles, rules, for measuring truth that chiefly belong to metaphysics. As a result, strictly speaking, metaphysics alone was worthy of the name “philosophy” or “science.” Even though the science of metaphysics had not existed in a fully-developed form prior to the philosophies, sciences, of physics and mathematics, the terms “philosophy,” “science,” had been analogously transferred to other divisions of human knowing (in a way had been given to them on loan, inasmuch as these divisions of knowing maintained an essential connection to the gradually-emerging science of metaphysics).

For this reason, absent philosophical metaphysics, strictly speaking, no coherent philosophy of education can exist; and no rational means exists to explain how (1) arts and sciences can integrate with each other to produce a common culture or civilization; or (2) how any art or science can exist at all. In fact, absent an essential connection to philosophical metaphysics, as I will show beyond reasonable doubt in this monograph, strictly speaking, no art or science can exist.

What I say in the paragraph immediately above is so true that, within the twentieth century, the negative effects of the West’s loss of understanding of the nature of metaphysics in relation to arts and sciences started to cause “philosophy” departments at colleges and universities, especially those dealing with classical philosophy, to become largely gutted. As a result, other disciplines, philosophical mimics, generally referred to by the oxymoronic title “social sciences” (oxymoronic because, by nature, they are not social or scientific) attempted to replace metaphysics as the queen of the sciences.
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Since they could not fulfill this role, higher education became weakened to the point that many institutions of higher learning have had to close, or will have to close. And the cost of education in general has skyrocketed.

We cannot be wrong about the nature of science and expect not to suffer damage educationally, culturally, politically, and economically.

While, during the twentieth century, the hate-metaphysics attitude that had dominated the West for several centuries had started to abate somewhat, it had come too late to save many of the West’s institutions of higher learning from their essential quest to self-destruct. Having lost with metaphysics what little sense of self-identity they had had, they could no longer even pretend intelligently to explain to others precisely what was their nature or chief aim.

During this time, some metaphysics texts appeared to try to stem the tide of Western educational and cultural decay, including ones written by students of St. Thomas Aquinas (b. 1224/25; d. 1274). Most, if not all, of these were composed specifically for use in academic programs. None was especially successful because none was able to show in adequate detail (1) how philosophical metaphysics is crucial to understanding the nature, divisions, and methods of the classical and contemporary sciences and (2) for solving the host of educational and cultural problems that we face today as necessary effects of the West’s loss of understanding of the nature of philosophical metaphysics and the role it plays in integrating human culture and civilization.

I write this book, then, in part, to help reverse this trend: to provide a work in philosophical metaphysics that will serve as a philosophy of science that can show in an intelligible, general way, the nature, methods, and divisions of the sciences, how these arose historically, and why they are reasonable.
I also write it, however, as a Christian, Thomistic metaphysics, because I think that only this metaphysics has the intellectual resources to (1) bridge the gap between ancient and contemporary culture so as to end the centuries-old separation between philosophy and science and (2) thereby, help stem, and reverse, the tide of the West’s cultural and civilizational decline.

2. How Descartes became the proximate, modern cause of the gradual separation of philosophy and science, science and wisdom

From the end of Greek antiquity up until the start of the twentieth century, the terms “philosophy” and “science” were largely used synonymously. For this reason, when he wrote his classic work in physics, Sir Issac Newton (b. 1642; d. 1727) understood himself to be working as a scientist/philosopher. So, he entitled his groundbreaking book in physics, *Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis* (*The mathematical principles of natural philosophy, not Principia mathematica scientiae naturalis [The mathematical principles of natural science]*) (The *mathematical principles of natural philosophy*). Further evidence of the truth of the claim made in the first sentence of this paragraph above is that St. Thomas Aquinas, who is well-known to have been influenced by Aristotle (b. 384 BC; d. 323 BC) and neo-Platonism, used these terms synonymously.¹ Noting the radical difference between St. Thomas’s understanding of “science” and the prevailing contemporary notion, Armand A. Maurer (b. 1915; d. 2008) remarks:

Today, no one would think of equating philosophy and science, even though there is little agreement as to what the distinction between them is. Science in general is thought of as any reasoned knowledge that is universal.
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and systematic. The ideal of scientific knowledge is an exact science such as mathematical physics, which uses precise mathematical calculations and a highly refined method involving experimentation, formation of hypotheses and their verification. Whatever philosophy may be, it obviously does not fit this description.²

The move in the West toward separating the two terms and have them designate different human activities came about gradually, over centuries, and had its proximate root in the work of the person often honorifically called, “The Father of Modern Philosophy”: René Descartes (b. 1596; d. 1650). Descartes thought of himself as divinely elected to be the first true philosopher and scientist, as someone who had given birth to true philosophy after centuries of intellectual decadence in which, strictly speaking, philosophy, science, had not existed. Prior to him, he claimed no one had possessed “The Method” of science, philosophy, as a system of clear and distinct ideas whereby human beings could finally completely know truth and totally eradicate doubt from our minds.

Strictly speaking, as I have argued extensively in my book Cartesian Nightmare: An Introduction to Transcendental Sophistry, Descartes was no philosopher.³ Like Italian renaissance humanists before him, strictly speaking, he was a sophist.⁴ His sophistic method consisted of an elaborate reduction of philosophy to systematic logic (a logical system of supposedly clear and distinct ideas) as a means of separating mathematics and physics from the influence of metaphysics and revealed theology, while, simultaneously, identifying mathematics and physics with the whole of science, understood as rational, logically-systematic, knowledge of sense reality.

As I show in the above-mentioned work, among the many mistakes Descartes made in working out his project were to (1) conflate
truth, science, and wisdom; (2) relocate truth, science, and wisdom from acts of intellect, or reason, to that of will; (3) replace the human soul with a “mind,” which he confounded with a collection of ideas; and (4) separate philosophy, science, and wisdom from any essential connection to a human faculty, habit, or virtue whose first principle is the intellectual soul of an individually-existing human being, a soul/body composite.

For Descartes, to know, to possess truth, is identical with knowing scientifically. As Étienne Gilson (b. 1884; d. 1978) tells us, Descartes’s grand project consisted in knowing everything by one method with the same amount of certainty or knowing nothing at all. Descartes had reduced truth, all knowledge (including wisdom) to science and was condemned to possess the whole of science or no truth at all.

Further complicating his mistakes, Descartes reduced truth (and with it philosophy, science, and wisdom) to strength of will. According to him, truth is chiefly a relation between the human will and intellect, an act of will on the intellect, not of reason or intellect considered as such. For him, the power of the will to cause reason to attend to, or focus on, an idea, is the cause of all truth, is truth, just as weakness of will that causes reason (which is simply a collection of ideas) to wander under the influence of unrestrained imagination (again, simply a collection of ideas) is the cause of all error, is error.

By replacing the human soul with a collection of ideas he called a “mind” and eliminating from the individual knower any numerically-one and intrinsic principle, starting point, that generated many natural and acquired psychological powers, Descartes and his intellectual descendants became totally incapable of explaining how science, philosophy, can consist of many acts performed by numerically-one subject. In so doing, he (1) separated wisdom, science, philosophy, from the individual intellect of the individual knower; (2)
transformed wisdom, science, philosophy, into will-power having no individual as its principle of origin; and (3) changed the formal object of wisdom, science, philosophy into a system, or nominalistic collection of ideas or facts (somewhat resembling Plato’s World of Forms), clearly visible only to someone (like him) with a will supposedly strong enough to enable his mind to see it.

Regarding the physical world around us, Descartes maintained that only mathematical ideas viewed by an exceptionally strong will can stabilize reason to be able to apprehend truth about physical reality. Hence, long before Friedrich Nietzsche (b. 1844; d. 1900), in his founding principles, Descartes had made the egregious mistakes of alienating truth, philosophy, science, and wisdom from natural reason, human habituation, and intellectual virtue, and identifying all wisdom, science, and philosophy, including that about the physical universe, with practical science and practical science with will-power.

3. How, by reducing metaphysics to history, Rousseau and his progeny replaced metaphysics with modern utopian socialism and transformed Cartesian will-power into the utopian socialist will-to-power

Unhappily, in short, for subsequent generations, modern “philosophy’s,” “science’s,” birth with Descartes had been accompanied by, founded upon, (1) a disordered understanding of the human person as a pure spirit: (2) an imperious, rationally-unjustifiable, attempt to reduce the whole of wisdom, philosophy, science, truth, and knowledge to some blind urge to power; and (3) a similar attempt to reduce all knowledge of the physical world around us to the order of modern mathematical physics (often today called “empirical science” or “positivism”) and its method of productive reason. As a result, even if philosophy, science, had existed prior to him, anyone
coming after him who accepted his method and imitated it, could not, strictly speaking, be a philosopher, scientist.

All of us are born into problems and difficulties that we inherit from others. For centuries the Western world has been beset by a host of social problems that resulted from mistakes made over the last several centuries by Descartes and those who accepted many of the founding principles of their “philosophies,” “science,” upon disordered notions of human nature, human knowing, and metaphysics that they, more or less, directly inherited from Descartes.

Consider some simple examples of such disordered ways of thinking common to the contemporary Western mind. Today, virtually all, somewhat-educated, Westerners tend unquestioningly to accept that “science” and “positivistic science,” or “mathematical physics,” are identical. Ask virtually any Western college student today the question, “What is truth?” and the student will tend to reply: “A fact,” or “What is factual.” Follow with the question, “What is a fact?” and the same student will tend to answer, “What can be proven.” Ask, “What does the word ‘proof’ mean?”, and the student will tend to say: “What can be scientifically, or experimentally, tested or demonstrated.”

Among other things, evident about such replies is the tendency that contemporary Western college students have to rule out evident truths and many traditional subjects of scientific study (like metaphysics, ethics, politics) from possessing truth. The mind of the contemporary Western college student tends to reduce the whole of truth to positivism: the practical science of mathematical physics. Apart from accepting truth to exist in positivistic science, the contemporary Western college student, like most Western adults, tends to be an absolute skeptic.

This situation has become so pronounced in the contemporary West that, on 22 March 2011, the Vatican issued a declaration enti-
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tled “Decree on the Reform of Ecclesiastical Studies of Philosophy,”
regarding the crucial role of philosophy, especially metaphysics, in
training priests. Commenting upon this declaration, Vatican Secre-
tary of Education Cardinal Zenon Grocholewski said that the most
fundamental aspects of life are under assault today: “[R]eason itself
is menaced by utilitarianism, skepticism, relativism, and distrust of
reason’s ability to know the truth regarding the fundamental prob-
lems of life.” He added that science and technology, those icons of
“materialist philosophies,” cannot “satisfy man’s thirst in regard to
the ultimate questions: What does happiness consist of? Who am I?
Is the world the fruit of chance? What is my destiny? etc. Today, more
than ever, the sciences are in need of wisdom.”

Westerners today owe the tendency to think precisely the way
we now do about science and philosophy chiefly to another French-
man: Jean-Jacques Rousseau (b. 1712; d. 1778). Like many thinkers
of his time, Rousseau admired the twofold attempt by Descartes to
overcome the growing skepticism of his age and, simultaneously,
to separate philosophy and science from the influence of theology
and theologians. Like other admirers of parts of Descartes’s proj-
et, Rousseau recognized that Descartes’s attempt metaphysically to
refund science and philosophy in terms of a system of clear and
distinct ideas was overly ambitious. He realized that the success of
Descartes’s dream to join all our ideas into a unified scientific body
of knowledge depended upon overcoming a chief weakness in Des-
cartes’s system: the ability of substances to communicate.

As is well known, Descartes had attempted metaphysically to
construct his scientific system by maintaining that only two substanc-
es exist, mind and matter; and that these substances cannot communi-
cate. Descartes considered matter to be totally inactive and mind, or
spirit, to be the only thing that acts.

Rousseau recognized that, in the real world, matter and mind
communicate. Since Descartes could not explain this communication between the substances of mind, or spirit, and matter, Rousseau resigned to overcome this failure by accepting a position that Descartes had rejected. He declared “modern philosophy’s principles” to be “essentially dualistic, animistic, and obscure.” Hence, Rousseau maintained, “only spirits are substances.” He thought that only spirits exist and even “apparently inanimate beings, like stones, are animate.”

While Rousseau accepted Descartes’s claim that science is a system of clear and distinct ideas, he rejected Descartes’s contention that God had given us this system simultaneously whole in a multitude of clear and distinct ideas buried in our mind waiting there to be uncovered. Instead, Rousseau constructed an elaborate fairy tale: a utopian history about human nature and origin that replaced metaphysics with history as the means to explain the nature and development of true science, philosophy.

Rousseau maintained that, under the influence of the “voice of conscience,” or “tolerance,” God has intended this system of science, metaphysics, to emerge from the history of the human race through progressive self-development (what Westerners, today, tend to call “progress”). In this process, in his classic work entitled Émile, or On Education, Rousseau claimed that God intends humanity’s true teacher to be a person of inspired, or Enlightened, faith, the singular person of strong feeling who has only nature as a teacher.

Shortly prior to Rousseau, Newton had also rejected Descartes’s metaphysical understanding of science as a system of clear and distinct ideas buried in his soul and had conceived of science, philosophy, metaphysics, as a prophetic history. Newton had conceived of this history to be deflated theology, historical truth about God’s operation in creation.

Metaphysically, historically, considered, Newton looked upon
the whole universe and its parts as a riddle, a secret, that he could read by applying pure thought to the world around him, “certain mythic clues which God had left about the world to allow a sort of philosopher’s treasure hunt to the esoteric brotherhood.” He believed that a secret brotherhood had transmitted these truths, this hidden teaching, about the nature of universe in an unbroken chain back to the original cryptic revelation in Babylonia.10

Beyond these strange ideas, Newton thought that, “throughout history, God continuously raised up prophets to lead his people back to the original truth revealed to the first followers of Jesus.”11 He believed he was one of these prophets, a magi “descended from a long line of scientific prophets who had anticipated his discoveries in a prefigured and oracular fashion.” Apparently, he saw his birth on 25 December 1642 as a sign of his special relation to the Magi.

In a fashion analogous to many Renaissance humanists and to the medieval Islamic thinker Averroes (ibn Rushd, b. 1126; d. 1198), Newton believed that Scripture hides a true teaching, philosophy, science, metaphysics. But, according to Newton, this teaching is about the history of creation, the original Christian religion, not a mystical and esoteric moral or metaphysical system (as many Renaissance humanists had thought) or a historically-emerging social system (as Rousseau had thought). In standard Renaissance humanist fashion, Newton maintained that the educational deficiency of their audience had caused Moses and other Biblical authors to describe this creation history poetically to make it comprehensible.12 By so doing, these writers gave to these simple truths about the original Christian religion and physical creation a lofty moral and metaphysical appearance that a correct exegesis of Scripture would deflate.13

In Cartesian Nightmare I have argued extensively that, despite claims by Gilson to the contrary, precisely speaking, Descartes did not move the West from the skepticism of Michel de Montaigne to
a new philosophy. Precisely speaking, Descartes moved the West from the predominance of one branch of the classical liberal arts, the *trivium* (the poetry and rhetoric of Italian renaissance humanism) to another, the *quadrivium*.

Strictly speaking, Descartes did not generate a new philosophy or a return to constructive philosophical thinking. He wedded together a new rhetoric and poetic view of the world in which mathematical abstraction united to a new logic of invention, not the rhetoric and poetic view of the world that had dominated Italian renaissance humanism, would prevail as the primary means by which Westerners would, from that point on, read the Book of Nature.¹⁴

In doing this, I maintain that Descartes (1) was doing little more than making an attempted correction in the more major political revolution initiated centuries before him by Francesco Petrarcha (Petrarch, b. 1304; d. 1374) and (2), under the rubric of the *quadrivium*, was involving himself in a poetic and rhetorical continuation of the age-old battle between poets and philosophers that Plato (b. 424/423 BC; d. 348/347 BC) had described in Book Ten of his famous *Republic*. Under the rubric of the “Battle of the Arts” this conflict had surfaced during the twelfth century between faculty members of the cathedral school of Chartres and the monastery of St. Victor in Paris; in the thirteenth century between members of the faculties of arts and theology at the University of Paris; and during the Italian renaissance with Petrarch and his Renaissance humanist followers.¹⁵

Part of the thesis of this introductory chapter is that we get a more accurate understanding of Descartes’s scientific project and its effect upon subsequent generations if we see it as a continuation of the Italian renaissance humanist movement, if we see Descartes and his progeny not as coming out of, or continuing, the Western philosophical tradition (which had died centuries before Descartes), but as coming out of and continuing the Italian renaissance humanist (poetic/rhetorical) tradition.
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Once we do this we become better able to understand the modern and contemporary ages as a whole and to recognize the truth of a startling statement that Gilson makes in his classic, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages*. There he tells any historian who might investigate the sources of “modern rationalism” that an uninterrupted chain of influence exists from the Averroistic tradition of the Masters of Arts of Paris to the European freethinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.16

Clearly, this neo-Averroistic tendency is present within much of the Italian, and post-Italian, renaissance humanist movement. It is clearly present later in Newton. I maintain that it is equally present in Descartes’s metaphysical claim that philosophy, or science, is a hidden system buried in his soul like in a book that only he, or someone who imitates his *Method*, can read.

During the twelfth century, Averroes had constructed a sophistic argument to safeguard the rights and freedom of philosophy against intrusion by theologians and others and to protect Islam against heresies that a weak understanding of philosophy is prone to generate. This sophistic argument consisted of distinguishing three categories of human minds and three corresponding degrees and limits of human understanding, learning, and teaching “of one single and same truth”: (1) the most true and abstract scientific mind of the philosopher, which supposedly apprehends, learns, and teaches this truth in an absolute sense in its hidden, interior meaning, through demonstrative reasoning “from the necessary to the necessary by the necessary”; (2) the less true and symbolic unscientific mind of the logician, and theologian, which grasps this truth in its exterior, imaginative, symbolic meaning, through logical interpretation and probability; and (3) the simple religious and believing mind, which apprehends this one and same truth through the imagination, emotions, and oratorical arguments.
Gilson explained that, while Averroes claimed, “the Koran is truth itself,” he maintained that the Koran “has an exterior and symbolic meaning for the uninstructed, an interior and hidden meaning for scholars.” He considered revelation’s true meaning to be its most lofty meaning. Its most lofty meaning was its philosophical, or scientific, meaning.

Averroes thought that philosophical truth is “the highest type of human truth.” This means that, for Averroes: (1) human truth is the highest type of Koranic truth; (2) the highest type of human truth is philosophy, or science; (3) philosophical, or scientific, truth is present in a hidden fashion in the Koran, and (4) only philosophers can recognize it!

Unhappily for subsequent philosophical history, I maintain that (1) Petrarch took and adapted Averroes’s division of human minds by designing his own program and method for harmonizing religion and philosophy and a new, fabricated interpretation of philosophy and its history to support it; (2) mutatis mutandis, Descartes unwittingly adopted Petrarch’s program and method, and a new interpretation of philosophy and its history to support it; and (3) mutatis mutandis, to correct weaknesses in Descartes’s system, by introducing his own trinitarian hierarchy of three categories of human minds and limits of human understanding, Rousseau accepted and modified the program and method of Descartes and Petrarch, and introduced a new interpretation of philosophy and its history to support it.

In Petrarch’s program, a new mind and profession replaced the trinitarian hierarchy of Averroes. In Petrarch’s scheme, the highest form of human mind is that of theologizing poets (poetae theologisantes), not the mind of philosophers. As a complement of this new mind in the order of teaching and learning, Petrarch created a new profession of poetry that combines the techniques of rhetoric, poetry, and theology: theologia poetica (poetic theology).
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In short, Petrarch appears simply to have attempted to use dialectical arguments and reductionism to defeat the claims of Averroes. He accepted the truth of Averroes’s premise that the whole of truth is a hidden teaching, or body of knowledge; but he sought to drive Averroes’s teaching into an opposite and an unwelcome conclusion by claiming that this truth is contained in the Book of Nature, which only the theologizing poet, not the philosopher, had the capacity to read.

From the standpoint of the prevailing, contemporary Western view of the relationship between philosophy and science, crucial to understand is that, in attempting to reform Descartes’s view of systematic science, by using an analogous sort of dialectical argument against Descartes to that used by Petrarch against Averroes, Rousseau shakes hands across the centuries with Petrarch and Averroes. Descartes had reformed Petrarch’s teaching by claiming that the whole of science exists completely within the human mind as a system of clear and distinct ideas; but only a person of exceptional ability, like Descartes, could recognize it. Recognizing that Descartes could not explain how mind and matter interact, Rousseau attempted to solve this problem by getting rid of Descartes’s notion of matter and of Descartes’s claims that, through application of simple Cartesian doubt, we find the system of science whole and complete in our minds and that only the Cartesian can read it.

To effect his goal, Rousseau (1) reduced matter to spirit and (2) conceived Descartes’s scientific system of clear and distinct ideas as initially obscure but spiritually- and historically-emerging, in a neo-Averroistic mental trinity, through the ideas of tolerance, progress, and the voice of conscience. For Rousseau scientific truth historically evolves, is the evolution of historical consciousness, and only the Enlightened, tolerant mind can read this history.

*While Rousseau accepted Descartes’s claim that science is a*
system of clear and distinct ideas, Rousseau rejected Descartes's contention that God had buried this system in our minds simultaneously whole in the present, and that truth consists in simple will-power. Instead, Rousseau maintained that God has intended this system of science to emerge from the human race, under the influence of the voice of conscience, or tolerance, through progressive self-development, or “progress.” In short, truth consists in the socialist will-to-power.

Rousseau contended that conscience is a way of speaking: an oracle, or voice, that moves us to project our emotions in increasingly unselfish, “tolerant” ways across three stages of development: from being a child of mechanical instinct, to being a moral agent, to becoming a fully social civic being. For Rousseau, knowledge, science, true communication between substances, are simply the long-term result of projected emotion, of an increasingly socialistic will to, and extension of, emotional power. As he saw it, the voice of conscience is God’s voice, free speech, an act of increasing states of tolerance or compassion whereby human nature emotionally emerges, or evolves, beyond a more primitive mechanical system of selfish individualism to an imperfectly social and moral stage, to, finally, a perfectly political social system of true science.

Rousseau realized that conscience in the proper sense (scientific will) cannot exist prior to the existence of knowledge and reason, the civic stage of complete Enlightenment. Where no truth exists, strictly speaking, no real conscience, freedom, or human communication exists. Like Descartes, Rousseau conflated truth and science and, like Descartes and Nietzsche, he located truth in an act of strong will, or emotion. For him, prior to the existence of real human science, no human truth exists. Hence, before humanity reaches its final stage of total social inclusion, a kind of totalitarian or collectivist civil will, scientific Enlightenment, Rousseau held that “conscience” is a primitive, mechanical-like groping toward the human good; and
no real, *scientific* will or true freedom exists.

Only the Enlightened system of ideas (global socialism effect-ed by the General Will) can make conscience (emotive, individual will) fully emerge. Because non-Enlightened ideas (1) are obscure and indistinct feelings and (2) cannot produce audible sound, they can produce no real communication, no real free speech. Rousseau maintained that such ideas generate the counterfeit noise of fanatics. Hence, prior to the new Enlightenment political world order, conscience and true freedom had no voice. No real free speech or human communication existed. Strictly speaking, human beings were not scientific, not free; and no true, or social, justice could exist.

Rousseau maintained that the voice of conscience maturely develops as a result of a system of human emotions (sensations of the self as a body) feeling themselves together, emerging, into a system of other, self-disclosed, individual emotions (the idea of self as spir-it). Union of these two systems of emotion generates the voice we call "conscience": a voice that moves us to transport ourselves from one system into another, from a child of mechanical instinct to a moral agent, to a civic being.

For Rousseau, the voice of conscience, God's voice, is the act of free speech, an act of disclosure whereby the system of nature transports itself (human nature), according to a neo-Averroistic mental trinity, beyond a more primitive mechanical system to a social and, finally, political system. Conscience does this by changing the way we talk (just as a male's voice changes as he enters adolescence) as we move from the lower stage to the higher.

At the mechanical stage of human instinct, which corresponds to Averroes's totally imaginative and emotional level of the ordinary believer, persuaded only by oratorical arguments, Rousseau thinks that God's voice (conscience) speaks through the mechanical voice of human instinct, human nature viewed as a dumb animal, or ma-
ch. At the moral stage of educational development, which corresponds to Averroes’s second stage of symbolic mind of the logician and theologian, God’s voice still speaks through the Book of Nature. But the Book of Nature is humanity emerged toward the first, primitive stage of Enlightenment reason and Scientific will, not the book of mechanical human instinct. At this point, the system of Enlightened ideas enables God, for the first time in human history, to utter His voice, and make it heard by the human spirit, not just by the body. That is, human beings get a taste of spirit, of freedom!

Rousseau uses the idea of tolerance to conflate the disciplines of metaphysics and politics and reduce the moral and political principle of justice to an epistemological tool serving a political project: to effect a state of higher metaphysical and historical consciousness, a state of Enlightened socialist feeling and Enlightened reading of history which, in our time, in some quarters, appears to be increasingly becoming the chief end of science. In short, in Rousseau’s hands, the classical theoretical discipline of metaphysics becomes reduced to a hermeneutic for reading history serving as a handmaid for effecting a practical political agenda: global socialism. 18

Chiefly because of the work of Rousseau, Descartes’s dream of the monopoly of the mathematician alone over the whole of science of the universe did not last long. Chiefly through the writings of Rousseau, Enlightenment thinkers started to realize that Descartes’s project to ground science as a logical system of clear and distinct ideas buried in the mind was a failure.

Hence, following Rousseau, and under the influence Newton, Enlightenment intellectuals like Immanuel Kant (b. 1724; d. 1804) and Georg Hegel (b. 1770; d. 1831) started to view the attempt to establish science as a social system of clear and distinct ideas to be the human project, a chief end of human life, an essential part of the human spirit’s call of conscience and practical
reason to cause the human spirit to emerge from conditions of religious backwardness.

The modern and Enlightenment reduction of science and truth to the social system of mathematical physics politically justified by the hermeneutic of tolerance in service to the socialist state is without intellectual justification. Apart from universal feeling that some higher, more-inclusive social feeling, a kind of neo-Averroistic, socialist intellect shared by “tolerant” people collectively establishes truth, it has no criterion of truth. It is little more than Enlightenment intellectual relativism, neo-sophistry: a myth.

Rousseau looks to me as if he knew this. In his hands “tolerant” people occupy the analogous position of Averroes’s philosopher (and the separated possible intellect that knows through him), Petrarch’s theologizing poets, Descartes’s extraordinary man of pure reason, Newton’s magi and prophets, Kant’s Enlightened intellectual, Hegel’s World Historical person, Marx’s proletariat, and the liberal arts as handmaidens to higher learning. In his hands, science, philosophy, and wisdom become reduced to being in the right historical state of mind, having the right feelings about accepting any and all differences that the new possible intellect of Enlightened intellectuals at any time collectively dictate.

In his famous Social Contract, Rousseau simply analogously transposes Averroes’s teaching about the unity of the scientific soul (a single, separated intellect that knows whatever truth humans know) from the order of theoretical to practical reason, thereby transforming Averroes’s single human intellect for the entire human race into the General Will of the political body: a social will. By so doing Rousseau gave birth to modern utopian and scientific socialism and its tendency to deny the reality of individual freedom and individual intelligence just as Averroes had denied the existence of knowledge, science, and freedom to the individual mind and the existence of the individual soul after death.
Rousseau’s influence on Kant is legendary. Kant considered Rousseau to be another Newton. He claimed that just as Newton had completed the science of external nature and laid bare the order and regularity of the external world, Rousseau had discovered the hidden nature of man.

Rousseau’s teachings about tolerance heavily influenced Kant’s political writings, especially his famous work, “An Answer to the Question ‘What is Enlightenment?’.” Kant’s political writings, views about Enlightenment, in turn, heavily influenced Hegel, who heavily influenced Karl Marx (b. 1818; d. 1883). In this way, I maintain Rousseau’s teaching about human knowledge and science gradually became the chief influence for the emergence of a neo-Averroistic understanding of science and an essential union between science and utopian socialism in the West in our time.

Ultimately, today, the reduction of “science” to positivistic science is essentially wedded to, depends upon, utopian socialism as its imitation of a metaphysical foundation. Today, a neo-Averroism inherited from Rousseau and the disordered understanding of tolerance that this neo-Averroism essentially employs as its hermeneutic for reading history has gradually become in the West the only means for scientifically and philosophically understanding politics, ethics, and truth in general.

Henceforth, serious concern about traditional metaphysical and moral issues about who we are as human beings, how we originated, what life is all about, and what is our ultimate destiny are supposed to be left to Enlightened, utopian-socialist intellectuals, intellectuals schooled in the methods of modern mathematical physics. They are not to be left to speculation of untrained specialists, to petty, bourgeois, philistine, individualists as a Marxist might say.
4. Why recovering a proper understanding of metaphysics is essential to restoring a proper understanding of philosophy, science, and their essential relation to wisdom

In my opinion, the disembodied reason of Descartes, the de-personalized, collectivist reason promoted by Rousseau, and the anti-contemplative reductionism of modern and contemporary physical “science” falsely-so-called are foundational elements of the murderous depersonalization promoted by modern utopian, and scientific, socialism like Nazism, Fascism, and Marxism. Having a view of human reason totally out of contact with reality, these thinkers and the Enlightenment socialists they spawned, had no way of properly understanding real, individual, human relationships: individual, free, rational, living, loving acts. They had no way of comprehending human beings as metaphysical, contemplative beings, or moral or political agents. According to all these thinkers, outside of mathematically-measurable data, or mechanistically- or socialistically-controlled events, no truth exists about the physical universe that real human beings inhabit and no real relations that exist in that world are comprehensible.

For the purpose of understanding the main arguments of this book, need exists to comprehend that the metaphysical principles that underlie the prevailing, contemporary, Western understanding of science and its development are not philosophical. They are sophistic principles of human nature, conscience, and natural law; chiefly ideological, propagandistic, principles derived from Rousseau’s sophistic, utopian dream of human nature, science, and happiness. Strictly speaking, no rational justification exists to reduce the whole of philosophy, science, wisdom, and truth to the procedures of the contemporary social system of mathematical physics. Such a reduction is founded upon a rationally unjustified assumption, nothing else.
Hence, if we want to transcend this fundamentalistic, Enlightenment mindset, and the murderous, utopian socialism that exists chiefly to justify it, in place of the disordered understandings of human reason that Enlightenment intellectuals mistakenly claimed to be the metaphysical foundations of philosophy, science, wisdom, and truth, then the acting person (the sentient, embodied individual actively engaged in free, personal, living relationships) must once again become a founding, metaphysical principle of philosophy, science. In place of some collectivist mass, disembodied spirit, or collection of mechanistically-controlled individuals as the foundation of scientific understanding, to re-establish the proper union between wisdom and science, the West needs to re-establish primacy of the individual, sentient being engaged in personal action as a first principle of knowing, truth, science, philosophy, and wisdom.

Moreover, need exists to recognize that our contemporary Western educational institutions and the socialist political regimes that give birth to and support these gulags are necessary effects of the application to the practical order of Enlightenment sophistry about the nature of philosophy, science, wisdom, and truth: of the political attempt to reduce the whole of knowledge to a social-system-science of historically-emerging clear and distinct ideas.

In short, mainly under the influence of Descartes’s and Rousseau’s disordered metaphysical understandings of science, philosophy, wisdom, and truth, the Enlightenment project unwittingly gave birth to educational institutions that are institutes of sophistry, essentially socialistic forms of propaganda and secularized fundamentalism. These arose as the necessary means for engendering a poetic, metaphysical myth in the form of utopian history that the whole of science, philosophy, wisdom, and truth are contained in the story, “narrative,” of the birth and development of the practical science of modern physics, which only the socialist-
cally-minded, mathematical physicist, like a shaman, can supposedly comprehend.

Under the influence of Descartes, Rousseau, and their progeny, modern physics sought to be intellectually all-consuming, to be the only form of human learning, of human truth. No rational argument can justify this quixotic quest. So, the modern “scientific” spirit turned to poetic myth, sophistry, fairy-tale history, and fundamentalistic spirituality to create the metaphysical arguments it needed rationally to justify its all-consuming nature. In practical terms, this means that, if universities are primarily institutes of higher education, and metaphysics is the highest form of natural human education, the modern scientific spirit necessarily inclined Western intellectuals to create propaganda institutes, and political regimes that support the existence of such institutes, to justify modern mathematical physics’ false claim that it is the only form of human knowledge, science, and wisdom about the universe.

Most critics of modernity today correctly call these neo-gnostic, fundamentalistic, principles “secular humanism.” Precisely speaking, they wrongly call them “philosophy,” “science.” Educationally, under the influence of Rousseau, these sophistic principles maintain that all learning is revelation, or disclosure, of the something that replaces the traditional Western creator-God, of something they call the “human spirit.” By “human spirit” they mean a universal scientific spirit (the spirit of progress, true human freedom, the human project: the utopian-socialist will-to-power) that grows by first revealing itself in forms of backward Scriptural writings and organized religious practices: the same sort of universal, anti-Catholic, anti-Semitic spirit that was a main cause of the development of Fascism, Nazism, and Marxism.

For their adherents, metaphysics is the epic poetic story, an Enlightened, fairy-tale history, about the evolution, or emergence, of hu-
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man consciousness, the universal human spirit (“true science”) from backward states of selfishness and primitive religions like Judaism and Catholicism, to that of a new political world order dominated by Enlightened systematic science and the religion of love of humanity, “secular humanism.” And tolerance is this mythical history’s chief engine of progress, story-telling, and means of reading history.

The means of such emergence consists of a synthesis of what Rousseau calls the “voice of conscience” (which he conflates with natural law) and poetic enthusiasm, or, more simply, “tolerance,” an increasingly inclusive socialist feeling for love of humanity, an increasing willingness to incorporate all human differences into a higher state of socialist, political consciousness as a means for achieving the political goal of world socialism: for everyone to think in the same neo-Averroistic way Enlightened intellectuals think.

Traditional Western universities, classical liberal arts, the classical understanding of philosophy, natural law, individual liberty, the dignity of the individual human being, and republican government, individual rights, and families are unsuitable handmaidens for generating, growing, and sustaining these myths. Needed are imperious, centralized bureaucracies.

To defeat these myths, Westerners need (1) a radically different approach to philosophy and science: one that insists on the existence of forms in physical things, including that of a soul within the human person; and (2) a return to an educational philosophy rooted in human beings possessing human faculties that become maturely developed through human habituation.

A necessary condition for the start of such a recovery program is that, like the utopian addicts we are, Westerners must bottom out and recognize that (1) what my friend and colleague John N. Deely rightly calls “postmodernism falsely-so-called” is simply modernism on steroids and essentially out of touch with reality; and (2) we can-
not build, or recover, a culture based upon the conviction that no real communication exists between substances. As Deely well says in a recent monograph, *Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of “Human Being” Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism*, “Just as in politics you cannot effect a revolution and at the same time preserve the *ancien régime*, so in intellectual culture you cannot develop what is new simply by repeating what is old.”

If we want to transcend depersonalization in contemporary science, we have to transcend the Babelism of modern thought that is essentially related to the denial of the existence of individually existing human beings naturally capable of communicating with each other independently of social science and the utopian, socialist state. We have to restore wisdom to science because, absent wisdom, strictly speaking, science cannot be science. In such a situation, scientific reason becomes displaced by sophistry, intellectual malpractice, propaganda, myth: utopian dreams.

Once we understand that we properly (most precisely) name things through their proximate causes, and that, in the case of arts and sciences, in a complete sense, we properly attribute art or science to someone because that person’s actions are being performed through a habit or virtue that perfects a person and a person’s operations, what passes as science from an observer’s point of view can become a form of malpractice from a practitioner’s point of view.

If a person with the knowledge of medicine misuses that knowledge intentionally to make patients sick, strictly speaking, that person is no scientist, no physician. The proximate principle of that person’s actions is malevolence, intellectual bastardization, not art or science; moral vice, not intellectual virtue. If this is true of a physician falsely so-called, it is equally true of a mathematician falsely-so-called and physicist falsely-so-called. Hence, strictly speaking, many contemporary mathematicians and physicists, even leading ones, are not sci-
entists. They are shamans.

To claim that the whole of truth is contained in the science of medicine is absurd. Equally absurd is to claim that the whole of truth is contained in mathematics, or mathematical physics.

The mere fact that a person has a facility to make right judgments about a subject does not, in and of itself, strictly speaking, qualify a person to merit the title “scientist,” which, strictly speaking, is only merited by the possession of the habit of science. Knowledge that has become divorced from wisdom tends to degenerate into a tool of malevolence, tends to divorce itself from right relation to other forms of human knowledge and become despotic. To claim that mathematics or mathematical physics is the measure of all truth is simply a modern version of the intellectual imperialism of Protagoras (b. 490 BC; d. 420 BC). Its intellectual foundation is non-existent. The claim is a piece of pure sophistry.

No medical knowledge that conceived of itself as being the whole of human truth could rightly claim to understand the nature of medicine. Many human beings would rightly judge such a grandiose claim to border on delusion, madness. Should not the same be true of a mathematics or mathematical physics that made such a disingenuous, imperious claim?

As Aristotle and St. Thomas understood centuries ago, by nature, human reason tends to rule politically (that is, justly), not despotically, over those human faculties that are naturally inclined to follow its directions. But this is true only of human reason rightly conceived. When a subordinate science, like mathematics, or physics, attempts to displace a higher science and, beyond this, to reduce the whole of truth and wisdom to its subject-matter and methods, such a project cannot be effected through rational persuasion. Ultimately, it must seek to effect such rule through coercion, propaganda, despotism, the blind will (better, urge) to power.
The human intellectual faculties are naturally inclined to cooperate with each other, and other human faculties, to help human beings become happy. This is one reason that, by nature, the human soul generates an order of arts and sciences. To be complete as science, knowledge must do more than facilitate right judgment about its specific subject matter. It must also, simultaneously, contribute to the perfection of a human being as a whole. If one human science/philosophy becomes incapable of co-existing with other forms of human science/philosophy, even seeks to destroy them, something is rotten in the kingdom of science, philosophy, and needs to be corrected. Such a “science,” “philosophy,” is no science, philosophy, at all.

If, correctly understood, science, philosophy, is chiefly a habit, virtue, of the human intellect (which is a faculty of the human soul), any science, philosophy, that denies the existence of the human soul and intellectual habits and virtues cannot correctly understand its own nature and be what it claims to be. Moreover, if intellectual habits and virtues are psychological qualities that relate different intellectual faculties to each other and to the world around us, destruction of the notion of science, philosophy, as a human habit, virtue, of the human soul must completely disorder the real relation of human faculties to each other and of human beings to the physical world around us. The cumulative effect of this disorder will ultimately be total inability of a human being rightly to relate to anything.

5. How my present critique of contemporary “science,” “philosophy” largely repeats and synthesizes criticisms made by several twentieth- and twenty-first-century intellectuals

Unhappily, the complaint I have lodged against the imperious nature of contemporary “science,” “philosophy,” is, in large part, nothing new. Most of what I have said above I have gathered from
twentieth-century intellectuals like Mortimer J. Adler (b. 1902; d. 2001), Jacques Maritain (b. 1882; d. 1973), Étienne Gilson, and Pope Benedict XVI. In fact, knowingly or not (I suspect knowingly), the Vatican’s recent admonition about the dangers of scientific positivism largely repeat critiques made by these intellectuals during the 1930s and 1940s.

Chief examples of such critiques are Adler’s articles “This Prewar Generation,” and “God and the Professors” in which Adler criticized American university professors, educators, and Deweyan “pragmatic-liberals” for producing a generation of American youth incapable of intellectually defending the principles of American democracy against Adolf Hitler’s (b. 1889; d. 1945) program of Nazi socialism.23

In “This Prewar Generation,” published in Harper’s Magazine in October 1940, Adler described American youth of the 1930s and early 1940s as (1) appearing to have grown up with no allegiances, no “moral philosophy to renounce”; (2) people who talk like “calloused realists”; (3) “having a distrust of any cause which spoke the language of principles”; (4) lacking a faith in democracy equal to that of Hitler’s Nazi youth’s faith in Fascism.24 Adler observed how, concerned about preparedness for war, commencement speakers in June 1940 “all spoke with amazing uniformity” about the dangers of the moral and political disaffection of American youth. “In their impatience, however sincere,” Adler noted, these speakers “committed a basic error in rhetoric. They did not even ask themselves why all their words would fall upon deaf ears, why stirring words would not stir, why even the loftiest visions would not inspire.”25

Adler claimed the reason such words fell upon deaf ears was that the speakers had forgotten that we can only control effects by altering causes. Based upon his then fifteen years of teaching experience, he proposed the thesis that the reason why American college
students and recent graduates did not take any moral, economic, or political problem seriously was chiefly because “they are sophists in the most invidious sense of the term, which connotes an unqualified skepticism about all moral judgments.”26 Adler maintained that “their only principle is that there are no moral principles at all, their only slogan that all statements of policy, all appeals to standards, are nothing but slogans, and hence frauds and deceptions.”27

In the political arena, Adler said that such skepticism reduces to the mindset of the ancient sophist Thrasymachos that justice is the advantage of the stronger, might makes right; with the exception that American students could not make, or defend, the case as intelligently and as could old Thrasymachos.

Adler laid the blame for immunization of American youth against the ability to defend democracy as a form of government intrinsically superior to Fascism clearly on the “scientific” mindset that dominated American higher education, on the shoulders of American college and university professors who had reduced the whole of truth to positivistic science.

Adler maintained, further, that this mindset had not arisen overnight, was not the peculiar creation of the preceding generation. He claimed, “What has been happening in American education since 1900, what has finally achieved its full effect in the present generation, flows with tragic inevitability from the seeds of modern culture as they have developed in the past three hundred years. The very things which constituted the cultural departure that we call modern times have eventuated, not only in the perverted education of American youth today, but also in the crises they are unprepared to face.”28

What Adler saw arising in American education since 1900 was a form of utopian socialism that Lewis Mumford (b. 1895; d. 1990) had labeled “pragmatic liberalism.”29 Adler considered as a “historical accident” the ascendancy of this mindset in the United States
simultaneously with the rise of Fascism in Europe. But, he added, “Only the timing is a coincidence” because “the European and the American maladies arise from the same causes” are “the last fruitions of modern man’s exclusive trust in science and his gradual disavowal of whatever lies beyond the field of science as irrational prejudice, as opinion emotionally held.”

In making this claim, Adler was careful not to make “science” his essay’s “villain.” The villain, he claimed, was the intellectual and practical misuse of science. He said:

We do not blame science for the murderous tools it has enabled men to make; neither should we blame science, or for that matter scientists, for the destructive doctrines men have made in its name, men who are for the most part philosophers and educators, not scientists. All these doctrines have a common center—positively, the exclusive adoration of science; negatively, the denial that philosophy or theology can have any independent authority. We can regard this intellectual misuse of science as another one of the false modern religions—the religion of science, closely related to the religion of the state. We can group all these doctrines together and call them by names which have become current: positivism and scientism. And again we can see a deep irony in the historic coincidence that just when the practical misuse of science has armed men for wholesale slaughter, scientism—the intellectual misuse of science—has all but disarmed them morally.

While Adler was right not to blame “science” for being the villain of his essay, I maintain he was wrong to call “misuse of science”
the culprit because, as he recognized when describing American college students as invidious “sophists,” the proper proximate cause of their behavior was “sophistry,” not “science.” Science could not have been misused by them because science did not exist in them. If science is a psychological virtue, a virtue of the human soul present in the human intellect, divorcing science from any moral standards and philosophical metaphysics, wisdom (as these students had done), essentially disorders the human intellect and makes the practice of science impossible.

Science, philosophy, started to rise with the ancient Greeks when the ancient physicists, like philosophy’s Father, Thales (fl. 585 BC) began to recognize (1) the existence of secondary causes, natures, in physical things; (2) that knowledge and wisdom were not the sole property of the gods, but were natural achievements of the human mind; (3) mystery exists that can cause sense wonder; and (4) that this natural wonder can be put to rest through thoroughly-natural, virtuous, reflection of the human intellect made in conjunction with the human sense faculties of the human soul.

Modern “science,” “philosophy,” is rooted in the Rousseauan conviction that (1) no natures, secondary causes (forms, including souls) exist in physical things; (2) no mysteries exist in physical reality; (3) strictly speaking, no physical reality exists: only spirit exists and is active; (4) the human spirit is God; (5) all human knowledge is an act of revelation; (6) science is a necessary condition of virtue and ethics; virtue and ethics are not necessary conditions of science; and (7) no human soul exists in which habits or virtues could exist.

In a way, in his “This Prewar Generation,” Adler recognized that sophistry, not misuse of science, was the villain of his story when he said what he called the misuse of science was “another one of the false modern religions—the religion of science, closely related to the religion of the state.” Confounding science with religion, state
religion, is not to misuse science; it is to misunderstand science, to mistake science for something it is not: an act of revelation; which is precisely what Rousseau and his progeny in “social science” have done. In so doing, a person does not misuse science in the sense of putting science to wrong use. A person displaces science and virtue with propaganda.

Moreover, since modernity has essentially displaced science, transformed what had been science into a kind of state religion, Adler is somewhat wrong to see the simultaneous existence of Fascism and pragmatic liberalism as a historical accident. If I am right, and the contemporary understanding of science is rooted in Rousseauan, utopian socialism, the rise of contemporary “science” in American education presupposed the existence of a socialistic mindset among American educators as a necessary condition for the existence of contemporary “science.” While the fact that American socialism was pragmatic liberalism and not full-blown Fascism might have been a historical accident, that this mindset was socialistic was no accident. As Adler well knew, John Dewey (b. 1854; d. 1952) was the chief source of this way of thinking; and Dewey was largely recycling the socialism of Rousseau.

In his article, Adler made other mistakes. For example, he claimed (1) “We do not blame science for the murderous tools it has enabled men to make”; and (2) “neither should we blame science, or for that matter scientists, for the destructive doctrines men have made in its name, men who are for the most part philosophers and educators, not scientists.”

Science did not enable men to make murderous tools. Lack of science, divorce of science from wisdom, morality, intellectual and moral virtue, did so. Science presupposes the existence of a moral culture rooted in minimum levels of professional honesty and justice as a necessary condition for its existence. A medical doctor who uses
knowledge of medicine to murder is practicing murder, not the art of medicine; is using knowledge (not the science) of medicine to carry out his crime. Moreover, science can only be science if it derives its first principles from the being of intellectually-independent beings and virtues of the intellectual soul, if science is an act of this individual knower using as first principles natural knowledge of the being of things, not myth, superstition, or propaganda (even Enlightenment propaganda).

Hence, Adler was right to complain about “the exclusive adoration of” what he misnamed “science,” as “one of the false modern religions.” He was wrong, however, to call this false modern religion the religion of “science.”

The mere fact that a person possesses knowledge, arrives at right conclusions, does not mean a person has done so by means of art or science. The person could just as well have done so through fraud, deceit, experience, cleverness, guessing, or knowledge. A student who arrives at right answers by cheating is no artist or scientist. Neither is a prophet; and, despite what Descartes mistakenly claimed, not every act of knowing is an act of science.

The contemporary reduction of the whole of knowledge and science to mathematical physics (to what Adler and many others call “positivism,” “scientism”) is a myth, chiefly the effect of a moral disorder, a political project: a moral refusal to admit that true science must have its initial foundation in intellectual virtue and evident, per se nota, principles that only a philosophical metaphysics (not utopian socialism or propaganda) can rationally justify. Divorcing itself from a rational foundation in intellectual virtue and philosophical metaphysics, and an essential connection to the generic end of all science to promote human happiness, destroys the claim of any intellectual activity to be “scientific” or “philosophical.”

As Aristotle maintained and Plato recognized, science is more
than knowledge of the fact: knowledge of the reasoned fact. Science involves the habitual ability to explain why something is what it is, what chiefly causes this or that. This is true even in the case of answers to “how” questions, which, when considered precisely, necessarily involve “what” questions (for example, when I ask how to do something, I am asking what to do). Absent such habitual ability to give a reasoned explanation of why something is what it is, what we misname “science” is no more science than the epic poetry of the ancient Greeks.

If the ultimate reason that mathematical physics is supposedly the whole of science and measure of all truth is that Zeus says it is so, mathematical physics has no rational foundation. Why, then, should it have a rational foundation when the ultimate reason given for its imperious nature is that the utopian, socialist state, the collectivist human spirit, the law courts, or that contemporary “scientific experts” declare it is so?

No matter how precisely a person could predict the future using numbers, if that person were to say that the reason he was so good with his predictions was that numbers are revelations, bits of news from the spirit world, no rational human being would conclude that this person’s exceptional intellectual ability was an act of science. If such be the case, why should any of us conclude that the mode or reasoning that Enlightenment intellectuals inherited from Rousseau and have tried to pass off to modernity as “science” merits the name “science”? According to Rousseau, all human knowledge is news from the spirit world, projections of irrational feelings, blind emotions, which have magically grown into science through conflict with other, supposedly backward, religious emotions.

As Adler noted, one net effect of such sophistry is that, like the youth of America’s pre-World War II generation, human beings start to develop a “distrust of all language.” 35 Hence, just as I noted
above about the mindset of most contemporary Western college students and Westerners in general, in the first part of the twenty-first century, Adler said students were convinced that (1) only the methods of experimentation or empirical research generate valid knowledge of the nature of the universe and human beings; (2) questions we cannot answer by the methods of the natural and social sciences we cannot answer in any trustworthy or convincing way (or answers to such questions are arbitrary, unfounded, opinions); (3) the great achievement of the modern age is more than the accumulation of scientific knowledge: recognition of the positivistic method of empirical research and experimentation as the only dependable way to solve problems (in consequence, modern times have seen human “emancipation from the superstitions of religion, the dogmatisms of theology, and the armchair speculations of philosophers”); (4) study of social phenomena became scientific when research divorced itself entirely from normative principles, “when economists and students of politics no longer asked about the justice of social arrangements, but only who gets what, when, and how.”36

Following Socrates’ critique of Thrasymachos’ claim that justice is the advantage of the stronger, and following what Plato’s brother Glaucon says to Socrates shortly after the start of Book Two of Plato’s Republic, Adler reasoned that, confronted by repeated exposure to such invidious rhetoric, a bright college student will readily conclude that: (1) moral questions cannot be answered by the methods of natural or social science; (2) in the domains of individual behavior and politics, except as expressions of personal prejudice, we cannot make “value judgments”; (3) economics and politics have no essential connection to ethics.37

Following Thrasymachos’ modern reincarnation, such a bright young student will become a disciple of Machiavelli, “as much a realist in politics as Hitler and Mussolini.” And, “if, in addition to being
bright,” Adler added, “he is proud of his modernity, he will regard anyone who talks about standards of goodness, principles of justice, moral virtues as an unregenerate old fogy; and he will express his aversion for such outmoded opinions by the ad hominem use of epithets like ‘medieval,’ or ‘scholastic,’ or ‘mystic.’”

Under the sheer weight of such indoctrination, Adler observed that college students of the 1930s and early 1940s came to dislike words like “truth,” “goodness,” because they sounded like “absolute values” so widely decried in social science departments at colleges and universities at the time. (Quite understandable since modernity had essentially divorced science from any and all virtue and any and all human good.) He then lamented the fact that opposition “to the teaching pronounced in unison by the social scientists” was not opposed by philosophy departments at these same institutions.

Adler wrongly attributed this lack of opposition to what he considered to be the fact that the doctrine of scientism was “certainly the dominant dogma of American philosophy” at the time. He saw this dominance as part of “the degenerative tendency of modern philosophy to move in this direction that had reached its culmination in American pragmatism and all its sequelae—the numerous varieties of positivism.” He maintained that all the varieties of modern philosophy “agree on one point: that only science gives us valid knowledge of reality.”

As a result, Adler concluded, “philosophy, at its best, can be nothing more than a sort of commentary on the findings of science; and at its worst, when it refuses to acknowledge the exclusive right of scientific method to marshal evidence and draw conclusions therefrom, philosophy is either mere opinion or nonsensical verbiage.” Within such a context, Adler rightly saw that, especially as recounting “primitive times before the scientific era” (that is, the seventeenth century), philosophy’s history is told as a history of guesses, some
bright, some wild, but all equally unworthy of modern credence.”

In short, instead of opposing the social scientists, members of “philosophy” departments falsely-so-called championed their moral relativism. In “philosophy” courses, Adler claimed “the student really learns how to argue like a sophist against all ‘values’ as subjective and relative. Far from being the last bulwark against the scientism professed or insinuated by every other part of the curriculum, the philosophy courses reinforce the negativism of this doctrine by inspiring disrespect for any philosophy which claims to be independent knowledge.”

To complete their job, Adler maintained that philosophy departments used semanticism (what his friend Jacques Maritain would later call “Babelism”) to implement the ancient sophistries that they had revived. In these departments, Adler claimed students learned “to suspect all words, especially abstract words.” They were told that “statements which cannot be scientifically verified are meaningless,” that abstract words like “justice,” “right,” “liberty,” “happiness,” that enter into moral judgments “have only rhetorical meaning. Denuded of deceptive verbiage, all such judgments can be reduced to statements of what I like or what displeases me. There is no ‘should’ or ‘ought.’”

While Adler clearly understood the sophistic nature of “philosophy” and social “science” departments during his time, I find unfortunate that he would call modern “philosophy” departments “philosophical” and modern “social science” departments “scientific.” Most twentieth-century U.S. college and university “philosophy” departments were not examples of “the degenerative tendency of modern philosophy” any more than the “social science” departments of the twentieth century were examples of the degenerative effects of modern “social science.” They were and are prime examples the modern lack of philosophy and social science, of the degenerative
cultural effects of neo-sophistry fulfilling its nature in modern culture under the rubrics of “philosophy” and “science.” Modern “philosophy” is no more “philosophy” than modern “social science” is science. Both are forms of neo-Protagorean sophisty. And their net effect tends to be “Babelism,” the inability of human beings to communicate with each other.

6. Why the future of Western culture and civilization essentially depends upon ending the separation between philosophy and science

As Adler observed in his article “God and the Professors,” like the health and disease of the body, cultural health consists in the harmonious functioning of its parts, and cultures die from lack of harmonious functioning of these same parts. He added that “science, philosophy, and religion are certainly major parts of European culture; their distinction from one another as quite separate parts is certainly the most characteristic cultural achievement of modern times. But if they have not been properly distinguished, they cannot be properly related; and unless they are properly related, properly ordered to one another, cultural disorder, such as that of modern times, inevitably results.”

In short, if we do not properly understand the natures of things, we cannot properly relate and unite them as parts of a coherent whole. This, however, is precisely the problem we have with solving the decline of Western culture and civilization in our time. We do not properly understand the nature of philosophy and science, the way metaphysics essentially relates to both, and how, through this relation, metaphysics uses arts, philosophy, science, to generate cultures and civilizations.

Many modern “scientists,” “philosophers,” in fact, tend to glo-
ry in maintaining that things have no natures. Failing to understand the natures of things, we cannot properly understand the nature of religion and unite philosophy and science to religion to produce a healthy culture and civilization. Moreover, if the activity through which we unite parts is a state-sanctioned activity that essentially involves state-sanctioned sophists defining the state-sanctioned natures of things, the unity we generate we achieve by propaganda, myth, not science.

The chief reason we do not understand the nature of science and philosophy today results, as Adler says, from defects of our intellectual leaders, teachers, savants. “The disorder of modern culture is a disorder in their minds, a disorder which manifests itself in the universities they have built, in the educational system they have devised, in the teaching they do, and which, through that teaching, perpetuates itself and spreads out in ever widening circles from generation to generation.”

Such being the case, if we want to stop the decline of Western culture and civilization, we need to do a “Hail Mary” pass over the contemporary intellectual hierarchy of the Enlightenment socialist state (of state-sanctioned sophists who dominate our colleges and universities) so that we can learn once again how to communicate with each other in properly scientific, philosophical, and religious ways.

As long ago as 1947, like Adler before him, in his Mexico City address to UNESCO, the great twentieth-century Catholic intellectual, Jacques Maritain, started to glimpse the need for the West to overcome the Babelism of modern culture, the inability of individual human beings naturally to be capable of communicating with each other independently of social science and the socialist state. At the time, he called for the Organization effectively to use education, science, and culture to contribute to international security and concrete
work for peace among peoples.\textsuperscript{47}

Maritain’s address touched on solving five interrelated and historically-rooted problems that he considered necessary conditions to building a supranational community of peoples and the future work of peace: (1) absolute national sovereignty; (2) Machiavellianism; (3) \textit{Realpolitik}; (4) transcending the Babelism of modern thought; and (5) reconciling wisdom and science, especially in modern technology.\textsuperscript{48}

At the time, Maritain claimed that modern nation states absurdly presumed the right of absolute sovereignty trumps all other moral authority while, simultaneously, appealing to the contradictory doctrine of natural law to justify whatever they chose to do. He called the claim that politics should be indifferent to a real good and evil “a homicidal error” and such appeals to natural law intellectually incoherent.\textsuperscript{49}

He added that only the right spiritual, the right moral and metaphysical, climate, one based upon a proper understanding of human nature and capable of affirming the existence of real heroes, can produce that power of authentic political justice that can conquer the principle and power of Machiavellianism. He maintained that we will never achieve a stable and enduring peace in this world so long as, in the structures of civilization and human awareness, we maintain Babelism in human thought (the divorce between wisdom and science that modern “philosophy’s” Father, Descartes, had initiated) and we fail to start rigorously submitting the applications of science to moral right and the true ends of human life.\textsuperscript{50}

Maritain thought that, to transcend the depersonalization in contemporary science, UNESCO needed to help the world recover a correct understanding of the human person and cultural truths from our classical ethical, metaphysical, and religious wisdom that support it.\textsuperscript{51}
Maritain reasoned that, given the contemporary world’s widely differing theological and metaphysical traditions, on a practical level, appeal to the existence of a natural law would be the best way for peoples of the world today to come to some sort of common agreement about what we are as people, what is wisdom, and how we should go about reintegrating these notions into physical science. If a natural law truly exists, he reasoned, it would depend upon a common understanding of the human person, and we should reasonably expect to find evidence of its existence and the notion of the dignity of the person that supports it historically in the world body of common law.52

While Maritain was engaging in such musings his French friend and philosophical colleague Étienne Gilson was musing about how some Westerners tend to be slow learners, have needed some time to grasp the full implications of the late modern project. At the close of World War II, Gilson claimed we in the West made our most astounding, involuntary, discovery: late modern science is essentially Nietzschean. “The great secret that science has just wrested from matter,” Gilson observed, “is the secret of its destruction. To know today is synonymous with to destroy.”

Gilson considered Nietzsche’s declaration of God’s death to be “the capital discovery of modern times,” bigger than the explosion at Hiroshima. While Maritain was musing about how to use recognition of natural law to form common practical agreements among the world’s people, Gilson thought that Nietzsche’s declaration of God’s death signaled a metaphysical revolution of the highest, widest, and deepest order in the West. Nietzsche is metaphysical dynamite. He knew it, readily admitted it.53

While Enlightened Westerners had gotten out of the habit of talking about things like “divine law,” some, like Maritain, apparently still held onto its vestige in Enlightened, secularized appeals to
“the voice of conscience” to solve the world’s problems. But what will happen to us, Gilson asked, when more of us start to realize that the modern voice of conscience (and, presumably, its principle: natural law) is the reflection of nothing, a convenient illusion we have created to maintain the intoxicating joy of our own poetic and sophisticated project?34

Finding ourselves totally free to engage in the perpetual, Sisyphean task of endless self-creation, Gilson said, we resemble a soldier on a twenty-four hour leave with nothing to do: totally bored in the tragic loneliness of an idle freedom we cannot productively use.35

To Gilson’s ears, the explosion of Hiroshima resounded a solemn metaphysical assertion of post-Nietzschean, late modern, man’s statement that, while we no longer want to be God’s image, we can still be God’s caricature. While we cannot create anything, we now possess the intoxicating power to destroy everything. As a result, feeling totally empty and alone, late modern man offers, to anyone willing to take it, the futile freedom he does not know how to use. “He is ready for all the dictators, leaders of these human herds who follow them as guides and who are all finally conducted by them to the same place—the abattoir” (the slaughterhouse).36 Having freed ourselves from divine rule, the necessary political consequence for “postmodern man” falsely-so-called is political enslavement by a totalitarian State. Having refused to serve God, we have no one left to judge the State, no arbiter between us and the State.37

As Gilson saw it, just after World War II, appeals to conscience helped some of us in the West, apparently Maritain included, to pretend not to understand the catastrophic consequences for the West and the world of the grandiose sophistry of the falsely-so-called “postmodern” project: Our destiny has become “the absurd” and “truly exhausting task” of perpetual self-invention without model, purpose, or rule. Having turned ourselves into gods, Gilson maintained, we do
not know what to do with our divinity.  

Clearly, for Gilson, just as for Maritain, the terrors of the late modern world are, in root cause, “modern,” as well as moral and metaphysical; but, for Gilson, the chief clash of civilizations we face today is not between the politics of West and East, or the West and other political orders, between the Western tradition and other metaphysical and religious traditions. It is a metaphysical and moral clash between the ancient and modern West.

No wonder exists why this current conflict has become an essential effect of modern “science” falsely-so-called. Having essentially divorced itself from all moral and intellectual virtue, including wisdom and happiness, having reduced all these to its all-consuming method, like modern economics and politics, modern “science” has essentially divorced itself from all real human good and the chief end of human life: the creator-God. As a contrary of real science, modern “science” has embraced as its natural end real science’s opposite, natural end: moral and intellectual vice (including foolishness and the chief natural end of foolishness: human misery).

Since the time of Descartes, “science” falsely-so-called has divorced itself from any essential connection to wisdom, virtue, and human happiness, and a creator-God (from all human good); and has identified itself with an intellectually-blind urge (misnamed “will”) to power. Such being the case, having embraced a kind of intellectual Machiavellianism as its nature, why should anyone be surprised to discover such a blind urge eventually to reveal itself as the neo-sophistic inclination to dominate: naked violence, universal despotism?

Gilson maintained that, from time immemorial, we in the West have based our cultural creed and scientific inspiration upon the conviction that gods, or a God, existed. All of our Western intellectual and cultural institutions have presupposed the existence of a God or gods. No longer. All of a sudden, God no longer exists. Worse, He
never existed! For Gilson, the implication is clear: “We shall have to change completely our every thought, word and deed. The entire human order totters on its base.”

If our entire cultural history depended upon the unswerving conviction that God exists, “the totality of the future must needs depend on the contrary certitude that God does not exist.” The metaphysical terror now becomes evident in its depths. Nietzsche’s message is a metaphysical bomb more powerful than the atomic weapon dropped on Hiroshima: “Everything that was true from the beginning of the human race will suddenly become false.”

Moreover, humankind alone must create for itself a new self-definition, which will become human destiny, the human project: To destroy. To build the world anew, to create the new scientific world order, we must first destroy the old. The only rational justification that modern mathematical physics can give to be the sole repository of truth is a Machiavellian-like ability to torture nature to reveal secrets: to destroy. Gilson claimed Nietzsche knew that as long as we believe that what is dead is alive, we could never use our creative liberty. Nietzsche knew and readily admitted his mission was to destroy.

If Nietzsche was speaking the truth about his project, which Gilson thought he was, Gilson maintained that he was announcing the dawn of a new age in which the aim of Nietzsche’s misnamed “postmodern” culture, its metaphysical project, is to make war upon, to overthrow, traditional truths and values. To build our brave, new, scientific world order, we have to overthrow the metaphysical and moral foundations of Western culture. “Before stating what will be true, we will have to say that everything by which man has thus far lived, everything by which he still lives, is deception and trickery.” As Gilson claimed Nietzsche understood, “He who would be a creator, both in good and evil, must first of all know how to destroy and to wreck values.”
In fact, Gilson stated, our traditional Western values are intentionally being wrecked all around us, everywhere, under our feet. He said he had stopped counting “the unheard of theories thrown at us under names as various as their methods of thought, each the harbiner of a new truth which promises to create shortly, joyously busy preparing the brave new world of tomorrow by first of all annihilating the world of today.”

What, then, are we who oppose Nietzsche’s project to do in the face of such a cataclysm? Nietzsche’s plan, his mission, is to destroy “today to create tomorrow.” Gilson considered forgivable that we should not have anticipated Nietzsche’s advent. “But,” he said, “that we should not understand what he is doing while he is doing it right under our eyes, just as we were told he would do it—that bears witness to a stranger blindness. Can it really be that the herd of human being that is led to the slaughter has eyes and yet does not see?” Gilson’s explanation for such a depth of blindness was that the announcement of a catastrophe of such an order usually leaves us “but a single escape: to disbelieve it and, in order not to believe, to refuse to understand.”

Whether Gilson thought Maritain suffered from such blindness, I do not know. I think he did. At the very least, Gilson clearly appeared to be saying that, if a natural law truly exists, looking today to international law for evidence of its existence and the notion of the dignity of the person that supports it historically in order to overcome contemporary Babelism cannot work. The chief reason that our falsely-so-called “postmodern” world is essentially hostile to such notions is rooted in the late modern world’s essential moral, metaphysical, and political rejection of the first extrinsic principle of natural law: the existence of a creator-God.

Instead of presuming a common agreement about the existence of a natural law upon which to build a common consensus about hu-
man nature, Maritain would have been better off facing the reality of the world around him, in recognizing that the modern project is essentially rooted in a rejection of natures, or forms, in things and that Babelism in modern thought cannot be overcome unless and until, like an alcoholic incapable of self-recovery, modernity first hits bottom and accepts a common understanding that forms exist in facultatively-independent realities. If modernism and false postmodernism are built upon a rejection of the existence of forms in things and of gods, or a creator-God, upon which the classical understanding of natural law depends, how can we make appeals to that law to give us a true postmodernism based upon the common understanding of the human person that will allow for communication between substances?

In his now famous and historic 12 September 2006 address at the University of Regensburg entitled, “Faith, Reason, and the University: Memories and Reflections,” Pope Benedict XVI offered to the world community a positive critique to help modernity expand its intellectual horizons to avoid real dangers that arise from what Maritain had called Babelism and Benedict called a “self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically falsifiable.” Devoid of such a broadening of the notion of reason, Benedict maintained that the Western world is incapable of entering into “that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today.”

He claimed that, while the West widely holds “that positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid,” it largely cannot recognize the universal validity of forms of religious reason. This puts the West in diametric opposition to “the world’s profoundly religious cultures” who “see the exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions.” He said, “A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of
entering into the dialogue of cultures."

Put slightly differently, the Pope was saying that people cannot enter into genuine dialogue with other people, cannot genuinely communicate between substances, unless we enter into rational dialogue with them. Such dialogue must have at least two characteristics; it must: (1) be in touch with reality and (2) assume the rationality of the interlocutors. Unhappily, the modern Western notion of reason arbitrarily tends to limit rational discussion, communication between substances, to talk about mathematical being and sense experimentation, tends to view all other talk as essentially non-rational. Hence, strictly speaking, people who hold this narrow, fundamentalist notion of reason cannot enter into rational debate with other people about moral and religious issues because their narrow understanding of reason cuts them off from such debate about these issues.

More or less, the Pope was saying that, in relation to religious and moral issues, the modern West’s narrow understanding of Cartesian and Enlightenment human reason places it in the same situation as many Muslim fundamentalist extremists. Modern Western reason tends to be arbitrarily narrow because it tends to be essentially fundamentalist, but in a secular way. It cannot rationally dialogue with people about moral and religious issues because it has relegated religious and moral being and talk to the sphere of the essentially non-rational, capricious, arbitrary.

The Pope well recognized, and recognizes, that this places the West in an extremely precarious position relative to religious cultures, especially to extremist elements of Islamic culture. How are Enlightened Western intellectuals supposed to dialogue with Muslims who think that God is an arbitrary Will, not subject to behaving according to mind-independent standards of rationality, like non-contradiction, when the Western intellectuals have a view of moral, political, religious reason as essentially irrational (but at the secular extreme) as
their extremist Muslim counterparts?

The West’s view of moral, political, and religious reason tends to be a secularized reformulation of a popular Reformation notion of the essential depravity of reason (religious reason, in the contemporary West’s case), just as narrowly fundamentalist as that of Muslim extremists. Hence, strictly speaking, modern Western intellectuals cannot enter the debate because, by their own admission, because of their arrogant and unjustified presumption of their own rational superiority, they are totally incapable of conducting rational dialogue in the areas of religion, politics, and morality. Clearly, if such dialogue is to take place, it will have to occur between individuals in the West and East who do not share such hubristic and narrow understandings of rationality.

While modern “scientific” reason has to accept and base its methodology upon matter’s rational structure “and the correspondence between our spirit and the prevailing rational structures of nature as given,” Benedict claimed the real question remains why it has to do so? Moreover, he asserted that the natural sciences have to remand this question to philosophy and theology to answer because the natural sciences are incapable of addressing the question. Benedict maintained that philosophy and theology are sources of knowledge derived from human experience, much of which in the West comes from religious traditions and Christian faith.

He made special reference to Socrates’ observation in the Phaedo that extended philosophical argumentation involving “talk about being” might incline a person to mock all such talk, and, in so doing, “be deprived of the truth of existence” and “suffer a great loss.” In a similar fashion, Benedict claimed that “the West has long been endangered by this aversion to the questions which underlie its rationality, and can only suffer harm thereby.” He argued that to ignore theological and philosophical sources of knowledge is “an unaccept-
able restriction on our listening and responding” to reason, and is something we do at our peril.71 Hence, he concluded by asserting that “a theology grounded in biblical faith enters into the debates of our time” with a program that involves “the courage to embrace the whole breadth of reason,” not to deny its greatness.72 “It is to this great logos, to this breadth of reason,” he said, “that we invite our partners in the dialogue of cultures. To rediscover it constantly is the great task of the university.”73

During the twentieth century, Pope Benedict XVI’s predecessor, Blessed Pope John Paul the Great (b. 1920; d. 2005) was able to help colleagues introduce this logos to the Philosophy Department at The Catholic University of Lublin (KUL), now The Pope John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. As a result, with the help of Mieczysław Albert Krapiec (b. 1921; d. 2008), and other members of this Philosophy Department at KUL, the Pope was able to spread metaphysical principles of Lublin Thomism from this Department throughout Eastern Europe and severely weaken the disordered notion of science that held these people for decades under the yoke of the Babelism of “scientific socialism.” No reason exists why a similar revival of Christian metaphysics throughout the West cannot do the same for the entire West in our day.

Hence, it is to this same great logos that this book and its yet-to-exist later volume(s) are devoted. In his Regensburg address, His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI attributed the attenuation of modern reason largely to a concerted effort that started in the West several centuries ago to remove the influence of classical reason, especially Greek philosophical reason, from the modern notion of science and higher education.74 Devoid of proper self-understanding, we in the West cannot enter into rational dialogue with other cultures.

If we do not know who we are, how we came to be the way we are and think the way we do, if we do not precisely grasp our
situation and its history, we cannot possibly expect rationally to listen to and understand other cultures. More than anything else today, we in the West need a *renaissance of philosophical and scientific reason*, a recovery of the understanding that a reason that is out of touch with reality, which refuses to have its judgments measured by mind-independent reality, is no reason at all, much less a scientific or philosophical reason.

If the chief cause of our contemporary, attenuated notion of reason is a loss of classical reason, its philosophical realism, and the essential connection of science and virtue to wisdom and human happiness, then nothing short of a new *Renaissance of Philosophical Reason* can restore *logos* to its proper place within world cultures. It is to this great *logos*, to this breadth of reason, that, in the spirit of Pope Benedict, this book and its subsequent volumes seek to help contemporary readers to enter.

Why care about the contemporary separation of philosophy and science? The answer, in condensed form, is that, if we want to transcend depersonalization in contemporary science, the separation between science and wisdom, end the decline of Western higher education, reverse the West’s cultural decay, and enter a new *logos* capable of transcultural and intracultural communication between substances in our dangerous contemporary age, we have to transcend the Babelism of modern thought that is essentially related to the denial of the existence of individually existing human beings naturally capable of communicating with each other independently of social science and the utopian, socialist state.

We human beings always use something we know better as the means, measure, principle for intellectually comprehending something we know less well. This means that, at some point, rationally to justify what we are intellectually doing, we have to judge everything we know on the basis of some chief intellectual principle, some as-
sumption-less first truth, something we know best. Philosophically, scientifically, considered, this something we know best cannot be a “belief,” because beliefs always depend upon someone’s knowledge.

Hence, for human beings to be able to make the claim to possess a thoroughly-rooted natural knowledge (not one solely rooted in a revealed theology or fantasy), some division of human knowledge must rest upon evidently known first principles, on truths we know best, or as the medieval theologians would say per se nota principles. At some point, to be able to exist as “philosophy,” “science” at all, the human sciences must rest upon assumption-less, reality-based, knowledge. Human knowledge, philosophy, science, must have a division that, through simple intellectual consideration of their natures, can identify per se nota, self-evident, principles upon which all human knowing, all human science, philosophy, rest.

This division of science, philosophical metaphysics (an intellectual virtue of the human soul), must be a simple intellectual consideration, one engaged in for no practical or productive aim. It must be what the ancient philosophers called a “theoretical,” “speculative,” or “contemplative” knowledge. The principles it grasps must be knowable as true simply by an intellectual understanding of the natures they involve, the truths they propose to the human intellect to accept (for example, that effects presuppose causes; two things equal to a third thing are equal to each other; possessing science presupposes existing and possessing knowledge; that contradictory opposites cannot simultaneously be true).

Absent acceptance of such assumption-less, theoretical knowledge gained through personal experience of the physical world in which we live, we have no rational foundation for claiming that our reasoning processes are rooted in philosophy, science. We have no rational grounds on which to explain, justify to ourselves, or to anyone else, precisely why our reasoning is rooted in knowledge.
Absent such principles, what we call “science,” “philosophy,” degenerates into sophistry, into what many people, including what many mis-named “scientists” and “philosophers,” today, call “belief systems.” All our “science,” “philosophy,” becomes hypothetical, assumption-based, rooted in arbitrary beliefs that we cannot rationally explain to ourselves or to anyone else why we accept. In short, it becomes, no philosophy, science, at all.

Every division of science starts with the evident acceptance of the existence of its subject matter. Hence, for students of ethics to debate whether human freedom and good and evil exist is as ridiculous as for a medical student to debate whether physical health and disease exist.

Furthermore, as Aristotle and St. Thomas recognized centuries ago, all branches of science operate in an architectonic fashion. Lower divisions, or branches, of a science take from higher branches first principles of reasoning, definitions, rules, laws, that the lower divisions simply assume to be true; but the higher have proven or know to be evidently true. Finally, even though the notion is largely ridiculed today, every science has a chief aim, and so do the natures that these sciences study.

As Gilson noticed and Aristotle knew millennia before him, the only way that an indeterminate multitude can cease to be such and become unified into a one is by becoming an ordered multitude, parts of a whole. In this world, absent unity, no individual being can act, because absent unity, no individual is this one being. All physical beings in this universe are composite, made up of parts. Parts, however, are divisions of a whole. No whole, no parts. And absent a numerically-one act (an end or aim) that can relate all the divisions of a multitude into a whole, no wholes can exist.

Parts only exist in relation to a common, numerically-one, act, or end. And these divisions of a multitude only become parts by hav-
ing suitable (properly relatable) qualities. Absent this one act, and the divisions of a multitude with relatable qualities, no multitude can become united to cooperate as members of a whole. For example, no fire to fight, no suitable qualities with which to fight fires, no whole unit called firefighters can exist.

All sciences study multitudes that each science unifies into a whole. To do so, each science must have a chief aim, and study natures that have a chief aim. All sciences, moreover, are architectonically ordered. The lower sciences naturally subordinate their aims to that of a higher science.

For example, as Aristotle says, *mutatis mutandis*, the art of using directs the art of producing. No chief aim that, by nature, governs the art of using something (for example, sailing a boat), and no act or art of producing it can exist. Hence, absent a knowledge possessed by a chief theoretical science, a first philosophy (metaphysics), no scientist can adequately comprehend what he or she does, or why.

In fact, in a way, all the other sciences exist to help bring into being the science of metaphysics (a highest knowledge, a first reason why) so that the practitioners of the lower sciences can have a more complete understanding of precisely what they are doing and why. For this reason, the ancient Greek poets tended to conflate poetry with all the sciences. And the discovery of a new science within the field of a prevailing intellectual culture tends to view this new science as metaphysics.

Absent the existence of a real, philosophical metaphysics, for centuries, modern and contemporary intellectuals have been unable rationally to explain and justify the existence and nature of “science,” “philosophy,” in terms of self-evident theoretical knowledge. As a result, these people have attempted to explain and justify these in terms of belief systems whose ultimate first principles have become reduced to utopian, socialist political projects and regimes, the bank-
ers, politicians and judges that run them, supposedly “Enlightened intellectuals,” and media elites whose propaganda helps delude the masses into believing that what their intellectual elites, politicians, judges, and educators try to pass off as science and philosophy is not what it really is: political ideology, propaganda.

Such is the condition of metaphysical justifications for the nature and existence of modern “science,” “philosophy.” Neither can scientifically, philosophically, rationally justify its existence, explain precisely what it does, where it gets its principles from, why they work, or why it is worth possessing for a human being.

Modern and contemporary “philosophy,” “science,” have never been able rationally, metaphysically, to justify the claim of modern positivists that modern mathematical physics constitutes the whole of human science. Modern and contemporary physicists cannot do this because modern and contemporary physics is formally mathematical. No mathematical formula exists capable of scientifically demonstrating that modern and contemporary physics constitutes the whole of science. Nor is this a self-evident, *per se nota*, truth.

Moreover, the first purportedly “philosophical,” “scientific” attempts to offer such a justification were miserable failures, based upon fallacious, sophistical arguments. Hence, this claim has never been rationally justified. Nor is it rationally justifiable. Such attempts have been, and continue to be, the chief source of the Babelism of modern thought.

As Adler rightly understood, to be able to transcend the Babelism of modern thought, we cannot look to modern or contemporary “philosophy” or “science” for an adequate solution. Such a solution must be a philosophical metaphysics. And modern and contemporary “philosophers,” “scientists,” do not have the foggiest idea, much less a clear and distinct one, of just what the nature of such a study might be. Modern and contemporary “science,” “philosophy,” are largely
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responsible for the Babelism of modern thought.

We cannot turn to most students of classical metaphysics to solve this problem because most of them have no idea what metaphysics, or philosophy, is. And we cannot simply return to the classical notion of natural law, or even to the classical understanding of the human person as a “rational animal” to help us. Modernity in its fully-developed and rotting state (postmodernism falsely-so-called) has largely twisted these ideas beyond recognition, divorced them from connection with the reality in which we live our daily lives.

To reunite wisdom and science, we need a real postmodernism essentially rooted in a new understanding of the human person. And we need to recover a proper understanding of the nature of philosophy and science, a real modern philosophy; not one falsely-so-called. To that task of fulfilling these needs, I will now turn my attention.

—Notes—

1. This usage was common for St. Thomas Aquinas, for example; see Armand A. Maurer, “Introduction,” in Armand A. Maurer (ed.), The Division and Methods of the Sciences: Commentary on the de Trinitate of Boethius, Questions V and VI (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 3rd rev. ed., 1963), p. VIII.


3. For a detailed defense of this claim, see Peter A. Redpath, Cartesian Nightmare: An Introduction to Transcendental Sophistry (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, B.V., 1997).

4. Regarding the conflation of humanism with rhetoric and poetry during the Italian renaissance, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (New York:


16. Étienne Gilson, *Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1938), p. 65. I thank James V. Schall, S. J. for recalling this passage to my attention; see his article, “Possessed of Both a Reason and a Revelation,” in Peter A. Redpath (ed.),
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A Thomistic Tapestry: Essays in Memory of Étienne Gilson (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, B. V., 2002).


20. For a more detailed consideration of Rousseau’s influence on Kant and Hegel, see Redpath, Masquerade of the Dream Walkers: Prophetic Theology from the Cartesians to Hegel, pp. 67–229.

21. For how Rousseau’s understanding of tolerance is currently being used by contemporary socialists to influence the direction of the contemporary world, see Peter A. Redpath, “Reduction of Justice to Tolerance in the New Totalitarian World Order,” in Telos, n. 157 (2011), pp. 185–192.


25. Id., p. 5.
26. Id., p. 7.
27. Id.
28. Id., pp. 7–9.
29. Id., p. 9.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Plato, Meno, 97A–98B; see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, Bk 1, ch. 11, 77a5–9.
35. Adler, “This Prewar Generation,” p. 10.
36. Id.
37. Id., p. 11.
38. Id., pp., 10–11; see Plato, Republic, Bk. 2, 361E–367E.
40. Id.
41. Id., pp. 11–12.
42. Id., p. 12.
43. Id.
44. Id.
46. Id., p. 9.
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48. Id., pp. 16–18.
49. Id., p. 11.
50. Id.
51. Id., p. 13.
52. Id., pp. 14–17.
54. Gilson, The Terrors of the Year 2000, p. 28.
55. Id., p. 24.
56. Id., pp. 28–29.
57. Id., p. 28. I thank John N. Deely for reminding me that postmodernism as popularly understood today is essentially (1) modernism in its natural stage of maturity: decay; and (2) should properly be called “postmodernism falsely-so-called.”
59. Id., pp. 16–18.
60. Id., p. 17.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id., p. 3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.